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ABSTRACT
Whether associations help to democratize authoritarian rule or
support those in power is a contested issue that so far lacks a
cross-regional, comparative perspective. In this article we focus on
ﬁve types of associations in three post-socialist countries, situated
in diﬀerent world regions, that are governed by authoritarian
regimes. We ﬁrst explore how infrastructural and discursive state
power impact such associations and vice versa. We then discuss
whether these associations support the development of citizens’
collective and individual self-determination and autonomy and/or
whether they negate such self-determination and autonomy – a
state of aﬀairs that is at the core of authoritarianism.
Our analysis addresses decision-making in associations and three
speciﬁc policy areas. We ﬁnd that most of the covered associations
accept or do not openly reject state/ruling party interference in their
internal decision-making processes. Moreover, in most of these
associations the self-determination and autonomy of members are
restricted, if not negated. With respect to HIV/AIDS policy,
associations in Algeria and Vietnam toe the oﬃcial line, and thus
contribute, unlike their counterparts in Mozambique, to negating
the self-determination and autonomy of aﬀected people and
other social minorities. Looking at enterprise promotion policy, we
ﬁnd that the co-optation of business and professionals’
associations in all three countries eﬀectively limits democratizing
impulses. Finally, in all three countries many, but not all, of the
interviewed associations support state-propagated norms
concerning gender and gender relationships, thus contributing to
limiting the self-determination and autonomy of women in the
private sphere.
KEYWORDS
Civil society; state; Algeria;
Mozambique; Vietnam
Introduction
Whether associations help to democratize authoritarian rule or support those in power is
the subject of a long-standing debate that, however, so far lacks a cross-regional, compara-
tive perspective. This article explores the roles of associations in three countries under
authoritarian rule: Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam. Despite many diﬀerences, the
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three countries are fairly similar with respect to the type and development of authoritarian
rule: All three countries are governed by authoritarian post-socialist regimes in which
ruling parties which subscribe or have subscribed in ideological terms to socialism/com-
munism have wielded power for several decades. Moreover, all three countries are former
colonies and have experienced civil war. Finally, in the early or mid-1980s, the regimes in
Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam initiated partial economic liberalization while political
structures remained authoritarian.
Can, under such conditions, associations contribute to democratisation? One school of
thought would answer this question in the aﬃrmative. Starting with Alexis de Tocqueville,
associations have many times been portrayed as ‘schools of democracy’ – where citizens
learn and practise democratic ideas and acquire civic virtues – or sometimes even as ‘bul-
warks of democracy’ (Hyden, 2010, p. 253). However, such propositions have also encoun-
tered a fair deal of criticism. Contemporary critics include Edwards and Foley (1996) or
Roth (2004), who point to the ‘dark sides’ of associations – for example, authoritarian
intra-organizational decision-making processes. Others have turned Tocqueville’s ideas
upside down and claim that associations are, or at least can be, supporters of autocracies.
Giersdorf and Croissant (2011, p. 5), for example, argue that associations are ‘amphibian
bodies’ which link society and the state. If autocratic regimes succeed in co-opting their
leaders, associations are turned from challengers into defenders of existing regimes.
Divergent assessments of associations also exist in the scholarly literature on Algeria,
Mozambique, and Vietnam. On the one hand, scholars such as Thayer (2009) claim
that Vietnamese associations, especially local NGOs working as service providers, are
‘apolitical’ and closely connected to the state. With respect to Algeria, Liverani (2008)
even portrays middle-class secular associations as supporters of the authoritarian
regime. Associations in Mozambique have been characterized by Pereira as weak, over-
stretched, capital-centric, and ill-equipped to be a serious challenger to the ruling party
(Pereira, 2011, p. 2). Where the state invites associations to provide expertise and to par-
ticipate in policy-formulation processes, they are co-opted and captured through pseudo-
democratic procedures (Fiege, 2014, p. 132).
On the other hand, Bui Hai Thiem (2013) sees Vietnamese associations as contesting
state power and representing ideas and values in governance about democratic freedoms,
transparency, accountability, and meaningful participation. He argues that associations
‘serve as fundamental platforms for the changing dynamics of governance in Vietnam’
(2013, p. 93). Concerning Algeria, Cavatorta (2015) detects no sustained impact of associ-
ations on the current political system. Nevertheless, he suggests that in the near future
these organizations might ‘be the building blocks of a new type of activism that can eman-
cipate itself from the subordination which it suﬀers at the moment’ (2015, p. 7). Finally,
Fiege (2014) sees Mozambican associations as beginning to have an impact on the govern-
ment in terms of opposing corruption, the sale of land, and the exploitation of resources.
According to her (2014, p. 133), Mozambican associations also constitute an important
voice against the re-militarisation of societal conﬂicts.
Cavatorta (2013) oﬀers a way out of the controversy surrounding associationalism. He
recommends shedding teleological thinking and normative presumptions, thus joining
Berman who proposes that associations ‘should not be considered an undisputed good,
but a politically neutral multiplier – neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, but dependent
on the wider political environment and the values of those who control it’ (Berman,
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2003, p. 266). Cavatorta (2013, p. 3) also suggests conceptualizing the relationship between
an authoritarian state and society as interdependent. Whereas political environments can
inﬂuence associations, these organizations are also part of this environment, which they in
turn inﬂuence (see also Froissart, 2014, pp. 219–220). Relational thinking thus helps to
avoid tautologies when examining state–association relationships.
In the following we ﬁrst present our theoretical framework and address some methodo-
logical issues. Thereafter we present empirical ﬁndings concerning the impact of speciﬁc
forms of state power on associations in authoritarian Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam
and vice versa. On the basis of these ﬁndings we discuss in the penultimate section whether
associations help to maintain and/or weaken state power in these three authoritarian set-
tings. The conclusion summarizes and discusses the main ﬁndings.
Theoretical Foundations and Methodological Issues
Since our research is explorative in nature, we base our investigation on a ‘focused theory
frame’ (Rueschemeyer, 2010, p. 1), which brings together, in an eclectic but purposeful way,
diﬀerent strands of relevant theoretical literature. Fundamentally, we build on Critical-
Theory conceptions of power, class domination and the idea of the capitalist state as ‘a
relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship
among classes and class fractions’ (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 128) in which such societal
forces and ideas can temporarily achieve hegemonic positions. Against this ideational back-
ground, our ﬁrst central assumption says that associations and the state are not opposites.
Rather, they form an overall whole, inﬂuence and are dependent on one another, and take
part, in diﬀerent forms and functions, in the societal exertion of power and in power struc-
tures. From a hegemony-theoretical point of view, the state is a relatively autonomous actor
in relation to associations, and follows its own interests and strategies. At the same time, the
state as a discursive construct needs the interpretation of associations and individuals, out
of whose interpretations it comes into being (Sauer, 2001, p. 161).
At the centre of our focused theory frame are ideas about three closely interconnected
forms of state power, which relate to and contribute to the exercise of authoritarian rule
and its legitimization. In concrete terms, we combine ideas and ﬁndings from Mann’s
analysis of two diﬀerent forms of state power, ‘despotic power’ and ‘infrastructural
power’, with Lukes’ understanding of two dimensions of state power, ‘power over’ and
‘power to’ (Lukes, 1974 [2005], p. 28), which lead to the idea of a third form of state
power: ‘discursive power’.1 This combination of diﬀerent forms of state power was orig-
inally developed by Göbel (2011, pp. 183–187) who used it to analyse ‘authoritarian con-
solidation’. We have however reﬁned Mann’s idea of ‘infrastructural state power’, which
signiﬁes the logistics of political control (Mann, 1984, p. 192), by diﬀerentiating
between ‘control through the provision of welfare’ and ‘control through limited
participation’.
With respect to the infrastructural form of power that we term ‘control through welfare
provision’, we start from the assumption that state’s control of society necessitates not only
means related to central administration, internal security, and similar domains, but also
the use of social welfare measures. The implementation of such social policy services
helps the state, through improvement of the social conditions of one or several groups
of citizens, to mitigate social problems and to counter possible political conﬂicts.
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Contributions of associations within the framework of state programmes in the public
health sector, especially for inhabitants of urban problem areas (including socially margin-
alized groups living there), can make it possible to control such areas and to pacify
demands of their inhabitants.
In our research on control through welfare provision we focus for empirical reasons on
the ﬁght against HIV/Aids. In the early 2000s measures against the spread of the disease
became essential for the survival of a number of authoritarian regimes including Vietnam
and Mozambique. The spread of such a pandemic is a challenge for authoritarian regimes
in which ruling parties claim that only their rule guarantees the nation’s independence,
integrity, wellbeing and economic and societal progress. Thus, the HIV/Aids pandemic
became a danger not only for those infected and not yet infected, but also for the rulers
themselves (on the case of Vietnam, see Wischermann, 2011, pp. 400–405).
As regards control through limited participation, we assume that the state gives prefer-
ence to certain societal groups and the organizations representing them – for example
associations of business people and/or other segments of the so-called middle class – in
order to gain more or better control over certain groups and individuals, allowing them
to participate within ﬁxed limits in processes of policy formation, decision-making, and
implementation. Essentially, the state denies the participants any signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on fundamental decisions. With Selznick (1949) we call such processes and this method
of the state’s securing its power ‘co-optation’.2 In all three countries, we concentrate on
the respective dominant form of informal co-optation and focus on economic policies,
especially support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and the possible co-optation
of persons and associations representing them. Such individuals and organizations can be
seen as potential detractors, thus for authoritarian regimes attempts to co-opt them are
essential.
We understand ‘discursive state power’ as a means ‘to make people want what the gov-
ernment wants them to want’ (Göbel, 2011, p. 177). It helps to secure the active partici-
pation of the objects of power in their own self-restraint (Jessop, 2008, p. 147). Thus,
we understand discursive power in the sense of Lukes as ‘power to’ and, more concretely,
as the ‘power employed by agents of the state through/on discourse’ (Göbel, 2011, p. 188,
FN 7). Here, power is exerted through controlling the societal discourse and shaping the
understanding of societal or political issues, historical events, and so on. We focus in this
regard on the inﬂuence of the state on norms which eﬀect both gender relationships and
the understanding of gender in general, as well as the involvement of associations in the
construction and maintenance of such power dynamics and the concomitant narratives.
We do so because, from the perspective of hegemony-related theoretical approaches,
gender is ‘a central component in the ﬁeld of state hegemony, since state discourses
produce hegemonic masculinity and gender hierarchy. (…) Conversely, the state develops
out of gender relationships. State and gender are reciprocally constitutive discursive for-
mations with respectively speciﬁc ways of interaction and institutionalization’ (Sauer,
2001, pp. 166–167, our translation).
Our second central assumption, based on our fundamental understanding of power and
the capitalist state, is that associations form part of the whole societal-political complex
and of societal conﬂicts, all of which constitute the state. Associations are themselves
the site of societal conﬂicts, are part of speciﬁc practices of state power exertion, and
thus can also contribute to the maintenance of state power. But they can also change
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these practices, insofar as their actions are not one-sidedly and mechanistically determined
by the economic base; because states are ‘constantly contested projects’ and because ‘a state
is per se characterized by compromise’ (Sauer, 2011, p. 134, our translation). Historically,
associations have been ﬂexible and autonomously capable of action. They have ‘no homo-
geneous goal’ and are ‘fundamentally ambivalent’ vis-à-vis existing systems of power
(Hallmann, 2009, pp. 29, 31, our translation). We thus assume that associations are ‘poly-
valent’ (Kößler, 1994): they can be bulwarks of democracy, supporters of autocracies, and
even both at the same time. This assumption stems also from the fundamentals of rela-
tional sociology as conceived by theoreticians such as Marx, Poulantzas, and Jessop.
Relations and interactions are important but they themselves do not explain the mutual
impact of the state and associations. Putting Donati (2011) back on his feet, in our
view, society does ‘have relations’ but it is not relation.
We use the term ‘associations’ because it has neither a ‘democratic’ nor any other pol-
itical connotation. Using this terms seems appropriate as our approach is fundamentally
open to various outcomes – associations can be supporters of democracy and/or autocra-
cies. We use the term ‘associations’ generically, referring to a wide array of societal organ-
izations that include ﬁve types: (a) mass organizations (e.g., the Vietnam Women’s
Union), (b) professionals’ organizations (e.g., the Conseil National de l’Enseignant du
Supérieur, an association of higher education personnel in Algeria), (c) business organiz-
ations (e.g., the Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique), (d) non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., the Institute for Studies of Society, Economy and
Environment in Vietnam), and (e) faith-based organizations (e.g., the Conselho Cristão
de Moçambique).
Our understanding of authoritarianism follows Stenner (2005) who argues that author-
itarianism repudiates individual and collective self-determination and autonomy and
strictly negates the supremacy of the individual over a group or a system. Authoritarian-
ism consists of an ensemble of attitudes and ways of acting that link the uncompromising
denial of diﬀerence and diversity with an unconditioned demand for homogeneity and
uniformity. This in turn leads to coercive action towards and suppression of people
who are ‘diﬀerent’. Examples of authoritarianism can be found in organizational practice
and in discourses. Authoritarianism involves
. a lack of tolerance of others and of views that diverge from one’s and the group’s own,
as well as a strict rejection of pluralism;
. the rejection of diﬀerence and an insistence on sameness and the prioritization of the
group over the individual (‘groupiness’);
. the personal coercion of and bias against people who are (ethnically, politically,
morally) ‘diﬀerent’ as well as political demands for authoritative constraints on their
behaviour (i.e., forms of state coercion);
. structures and mechanisms that ensure the prioritization of the group over the individ-
ual as well as group interests over those of the individual (Stenner, 2005, pp. 14–20).
Collective and individual self-determination and autonomy are also at the core of our
understanding of democracy. More speciﬁcally, autonomy is the fundamental democratic
ideal of a deliberative understanding of democracy and ‘describes the essential meaning of
democratic self-rule. […] Autonomy means that individuals – both individually and
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collectively – hold their interests with due consideration, and are able to provide reasons
for holding them’ (Warren, 2001, p. 62). Accordingly, in the area of intra-organizational
decision-making and the three policy ﬁelds that we focus on, we explore whether associ-
ations support the development of citizens’ collective and individual self-determination
and autonomy and/or whether they stand for the negation of such self-determination
and autonomy – a state of aﬀairs that is at the core of authoritarianism. The democ-
racy-promoting eﬀects of associations and their activities include developmental eﬀects
(e.g., the development of general individual political skills and attitudes such as public
speaking), public-sphere eﬀects (e.g., the exertion of inﬂuence on public opinion in
various ways), and institutional eﬀects (e.g., the representation of interests or resistance
to planned or taken decisions, see Warren, 2001, pp. 142–205).
In the empirical sections of this article we seek to answer the question of whether
associations help to maintain and/or weaken the above described various forms of state
power. A ‘weakening’ of the infrastructural or discursive power of the authoritarian
state occurs when associations’ actions support the development of citizens’ individual
and collective self-determination and autonomy. Such forms of state power are ‘main-
tained’ when associations’ actions negate and deny such self-determination and autonomy
is denied and negated. In an operational sense, the ‘maintenance’ of infrastructural and
discursive state power is assumed to take place if and when
. there is an unquestioning acceptance of authoritarian state-determined political struc-
tures and rules on the associations’ side;
. associations present policies which contribute to limiting and negating the collective
and individual self-determination of citizens;
. associations relinquish political forms and contents that present alternatives to the
dominant politics and policies of the state;
. associations support state discourses relating to gender norms that are suitable for
decreasing the power, social status, and recognition of women.
The ‘weakening’ of infrastructural and discursive state power is assumed to take place if
and when
. associations aim and/or help to set up state structures and rules which are bound to
promote the autonomy and self-determination of citizens;
. associations themselves engage in practices to support the development of citizens’ self-
determination and autonomy;
. associations formulate counter-positions and actively engage in the political and
societal discourse surrounding gender norms in ways that are apt to increase the
power, social status, and the recognition of women.
Methodological Issues
Research in all three countries took place in two stages. First, we explored the impact of the
state’s infrastructural and discursive power on associations. Associations were selected
using the typical case sampling method, and the research team conducted semi-structured
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interviews with 20, 24, and 27 associations in Vietnam, Algeria, and Mozambique, respect-
ively, between June and August 2014. Second, we analysed the impact of associations on
these forms of state power. In this phase we focused on seven associations in Algeria and
Mozambique and 10 in Vietnam. Interviews took place between February and April 2015.
In both stages we interviewed the leading personnel of selected associations, e.g., the chair-
person or his/her deputy. Where necessary, specialists of the association responsible for
speciﬁc, for example legal, issues were also consulted. In all three countries the same inter-
view guidelines were used.3 Members of the core research team and its academic partners
in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam (up to seven experts per country) collectively
examined in a two-stage process all interview reports. All quotations in the subsequent
sections of this article derive from our interview reports. To protect the interviewees,
we anonymized the names of the organizations and of their representatives.
Notably, our results are not representative for all associations and their interaction with
the state’s infrastructural and discursive power and vice versa in all three countries. Rather,
our empirical ﬁndings and the conclusions derived therefrom refer to the ﬁve speciﬁc
types of associations, which exist in all three countries, and their relationships with the
state’s forms of power and vice versa.4 What we oﬀer are empirically founded results
and interpretations from semi-structured interviews with representatives from Algerian,
Mozambican and Vietnamese associations, which belong to one of ﬁve types of associ-
ations mentioned above and which work in relevant policy ﬁelds. We conﬁned our
research to Algiers and Oran in Algeria, Maputo and Beira in Mozambique, and Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam because the whole spectrum of association types
can only be found in the capital and second-biggest cities of these countries.
Our analysis involved process tracing. In the sense of ‘causal process observations’ with
dense description as the prerequisite (Collier, 2011, p. 823), we ﬁrst explored and ident-
iﬁed the impact that speciﬁc forms of state power have on associations and vice versa.
We then examined whether or not, in which ways, and to which extent state-associations
interactions in the three countries lead to consequences, which can be identiﬁed as
strengthening and/or weakening of authoritarianism. For this we relied, based on the
propositions enumerated above, on methods of pattern matching and on expert
judgements.
Associations and the Infrastructural Power of the State
In all three countries the state directly or indirectly inﬂuences intra-organizational
decision-making processes within associations, including decisions on activities and, in
particular, leading personnel.5 Associations in all three countries tend to be hierarchically
structured, something which can be traced back directly (Vietnam) or indirectly (Algeria,
Mozambique) to the impact of the state and/or the ruling party on associations.
In Algeria, the majority of business people’s and professionals’ associations interviewed
have formal democratic regulations governing their internal decision-making. However,
when they come up with positions on economic policies they often consult informally
with the authorities and coordinate their decisions with the representatives of those in
power beforehand. Moreover, the laws and institutions of the state heavily impact associ-
ations’ internal decision-making processes. Let us take the example of the Algerian NGO
1, which works in the ﬁeld of HIV/AIDS prevention. The holding of this NGO’s general
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assembly is required by law. During some of these general assemblies, a Ministry of Justice
representative is present, ostensibly in a private capacity, to make sure that all the state’s
administrative requirements are met. A representative of this NGO interviewed by us did
not consider this an undue form of state interference, claiming that it helped to guarantee
the smooth and democratic functioning of the NGO. As he further explained, it is nor-
mally the NGO itself that invites a representative of the Ministry of Justice to its
general assemblies.
In Algeria, mass organizations, professionals’ organizations, and business organizations
are often led by people who entertain close relationships with representatives of the state.6
Almost all the associations interviewed exhibit a concentration of power in the hands of
the president or the director. This is also true for NGOs and Islamic associations, and
changes in the leading personnel do not take place often. Since most associations
depend on the state in terms of funding – mostly in the form of annual ﬁnancial allo-
cations, called ‘subventions annuelles’ – and other forms of state support, they might be
willing to adapt their activities according to the state’s aims and purposes.
In Mozambique, personal relationships with and close ties to the ruling FRELIMO
party often have a decisive impact on the election of associations’ leading personnel
and their choice of activities. As in Algeria, the majority of associations are hierarchically
structured. Leading persons from FRELIMO and from state institutions inﬂuence associ-
ations’ internal decision-making processes. Even if associations pretend to be democrati-
cally structured, upon closer inspection it becomes evident that many decisions are taken
in advance of formal decision-making processes and that many decisions are taken
informally.
In Vietnam, the impact of the state on all types of associations is pervasive. The repre-
sentatives of various mass organizations, professionals’ organizations, and business organ-
izations adhere to and apply various principles of ‘democratic centralism’. This implies
that a small group of people or even a single person makes prior decisions, that the prin-
ciple of ‘collective leadership, individual responsibility’ is abided by, and that after a vote
the minority must follow the opinion of the majority. These associations are either directly
or indirectly under the ‘leadership of the Party’ and are ﬁrmly integrated into the political-
administrative system of the Party and the state. The Communist Party, or, more precisely,
some key ﬁgures in the Party cells within these organizations, have the ﬁnal say on all
aspects concerning the personnel of the respective organizations and the activities they
pursue. Even some NGOs apply certain principles related to ‘democratic centralism’.
The representatives of such interviewed associations appear to believe in the usefulness
of these principles.
No diﬀerence between decision-making within the Communist Party, the state, and
associations is discernible with respect the application of the principle that the minority
follows the opinion of the majority. As a representative of NGO 4 stated: ‘Once consen-
sus is reached, everyone must be committed to follow. If someone is not satisﬁed, he/she
must still ‘follow the masses’ [the collective strength]’. There are, however, ‘outliers’ with
respect to intra-organizational decision-making processes. For example, the Hanoi-
based NGO 5 experiments with an ‘acting director regime’ and the idea and practice
of ‘project holders’ – two mechanisms that seem suited to weakening intra-organiz-
ational authoritarianism.
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Infrastructural Power as ‘Control Through Welfare Provision’
Our evidence varies concerning the interdependencies between associations and the state
in the public welfare sector – concretely, in the realm of HIV/AIDS prevention and the
provision of care for people living with HIV (PLWHIV). In Algeria and Vietnam the
state plays a very signiﬁcant role in this policy ﬁeld and, at least in Vietnam, the pressure
on associations and the state’s control of this segment of society is strong. Associations in
Algeria and Vietnam support the state and state policies in this ﬁeld and do not oﬀer open
and explicit critiques. In both countries associations help foster the role of the state as the
most important actor in this policy ﬁeld. Due to the international donors’ ﬁnancial
support, the Mozambican state’s role in this policy ﬁeld seems less signiﬁcant than in
the other two cases. Nevertheless, the state claims to be spearheading the ﬁght against
HIV/AIDS. Mozambican associations active in this policy ﬁeld have gained more room
to manoeuvre and the people they support have more opportunities to lead a self-deter-
mined and autonomous life.
In Algeria the interviewed associations in this policy ﬁeld generally support the state
and state policies. They are engaged within the realm of state programmes and their
aim is to contribute to the realization of the aims the state deﬁnes. The organizations
conduct awareness-raising and prevention activities and one of them does so in the frame-
work of a larger awareness-raising programme on sexual and reproductive health.
The pursuit of rights-based approaches and the aim of making PLWHIV autonomous
are highly contested among associations in Algeria: NGO 1 pursues something akin to a
rights-based approach. The organization’s representative emphasized that the main aim
of the NGO is to make PLWHIV ‘autonomous’ in the personal, social, and ﬁnancial
sense. NGO 1 does not, however, encourage the formation of community-based organ-
izations and self-help groups. Rather, it supports PLHWHIV to regularly attend their
treatments, take advantage of all the state-run healthcare services available to them
and leads infected people to the state’s healthcare services and institutions/clinics.
Making PLWHIV autonomous is, however, not the main goal of Algerian associations
working in the ﬁeld of HIV/AIDS. A representative of Oran-based NGO 2 stated very
clearly that he did not want to follow a rights-based approach at all. Thus, Algerian
associations help to foster the state’s role as the most important actor in this realm of
welfare policies. In this regard, it is important to note that the associations working
on HIV/AIDS, which we interviewed, receive state funding (subventions annuelles)
and other forms of state support.
The ﬁndings from Mozambique suggest that – compared to Algeria and Vietnam –
there is less pressure from the state on associations working in the ﬁeld of HIV/AIDS pre-
vention and care provision for PLWHIV. Here, associations have more room to
manoeuvre. The interviewed associations pursue a rights-based approach, though they
do not use this expression. In their activities they focus mainly on awareness-raising
with regard to HIV/AIDS, but they also promote self-help and support the development
of networks of aﬀected individuals and/or groups. The approaches used by associations
oﬀer individuals and groups of aﬀected people opportunities to acquire the skills to lead
a more self-determined and autonomous life. While international donors can and do
provide Mozambican associations with funds without going through state channels, the
state seems to have retained substantial supervisory power in this policy ﬁeld.
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In Vietnam the state’s impact on associations working in the policy ﬁeld of HIV/AIDS
prevention and care provision for PLWHIV appears to be much stronger than in Mozam-
bique. To a varying extent, the involvement of associations in state programmes (and,
thus, their dependency on state funding) impacts the activities these organizations under-
take, as well as the selection of the social groups these associations cater to. However, only
one of the NGOs interviewed, NGO 2 based in Ho Chi Minh City, is integrated into a
state-funded programme.
The associations interviewed do not act against state pressure. Rather, they accept and
act strictly within the authoritarian state-determined political structures and rules; they do
not question or criticize, at least not openly and not in interviews, the existing structures
and rules; and they do not criticize the policies the state stands for and/or has pursued.
Rather, the associations we interviewed support the state’s HIV/AIDS-related welfare pol-
icies. It is thus not surprising that these associations help contribute to the widespread per-
ception of the Vietnamese state as the most important actor in this policy ﬁeld and the one
who keeps the AIDS pandemic at bay. In terms of welfare policies, associations of various
types help to ﬁll the gap that the state intentionally or unintentionally leaves. Vietnamese
associations provide services for people such as PLWHIV, sex workers, and men who have
sex with men, whom the state is not able and/or not willing to reach and to provide ser-
vices to. Thus, associations relieve the state’s burden.
Some Vietnamese NGOs use rights-based approaches, pursuing the aim of self-empow-
erment of PLWHIV and other social minority members; support the development of citi-
zens’ individual and collective self-determination and autonomy; and help present
alternatives to the dominant politics and policies. However, the NGO representatives
interviewed made it clear that if they pursue such activities, this happens in an indirect
way and without explicit critique of state politics and policies.
Infrastructural Power as ‘Control Through Limited Participation’
In terms of interdependencies between the state and associations working in the realm of
economic policies, especially the promotion of SMEs (Vietnam and Mozambique) and the
promotion of private enterprises (Algeria), in all three countries the state invites certain
associations to help improve the quality of the economic policies it pursues. Associations
can participate in meetings with state oﬃcials in various fora, but their representatives are
excluded from those places where the ‘real’ power resides. The representatives and associ-
ations involved enjoy various privileges. They are co-opted by the state and they support
the state and state policies in this policy ﬁeld.
In the case of Algeria, various types of associations are invited to provide expertise and
advice to the state during law- and policymaking processes. Several of the associations
interviewed were allowed to provide such input. They were, however, largely unable to
single out which of their policy recommendations have been adopted by the state (e.g.,
through incorporation in legal documents). Furthermore, these associations had no
access to those committees and venues where the decisions were ultimately taken.
Notably, all the associations interviewed on this issue accepted this exclusion, stating
that it was the responsibility of the state and not of associations to decide upon laws
and policies. In doing so, the associations explicitly reaﬃrmed and legitimated the role
of the state as the prime actor in law and policy decision-making processes (at least in
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this policy ﬁeld). According to a representative of Algerian Business Organisation 1, the
organization does not strive to gain access to the decision-making committees and
venues because it is ‘legalistic’ in its stance and therefore accepts that it is the parliament
and the state executive who are the decision makers. Concurrently, Business Organisation
2’s representative elaborated, even if they do not like a law or policy passed by the state,
they nevertheless have to accept and apply it afterwards, not least because they had been
involved in its formulation: ‘I have participated in preparing the couscous, so I have to eat
it, whether I like it or not’.
Algerian associations involved in economic law- and policy-formulation processes
refrain from criticizing the state openly and are co-opted by various means, such as the
allocation of material resources (e.g., in the form of rents), the provision of comparative
advantages vis-à-vis other social actors (e.g., information advantages over other entrepre-
neurs), or strong personal relationships between leading personnel and leading represen-
tatives of the Algerian state. The strategy of co-opting entrepreneurs’ associations appears
to form part of a larger state strategy of concentrating the representation of certain social
sectors in the hands of co-opted associations, which serve as exclusive channels for trans-
mitting the demands of these social sectors to the state. The determination of which
association represents a particular social sector, however, remains in the hands of the state.
In Mozambique, professionals’ and business organizations are invited or allowed to
participate in policymaking processes concerning SME promotion. Both types of associ-
ations are involved in formal and informal consultation processes with state representa-
tives. These processes take a variety of forms, including oﬃcial platforms (e.g., public–
private dialogues, direct talks, meetings, invitations, seminars, etc.). They also appear to
abstain from activities intended to create public pressure – for example, strikes.
Both types of associations have so far only been able to have a very limited number of
demands included in political decision-making processes. According to a representative of
Mozambican Business Organisation 1, of the 200 recommendations provided by that
association to the government, only 17 had been taken up. Often associations do not
receive any feedback from the state and state agencies concerning their input, and they
never know to what extent their recommendations are implemented. Similarly, associ-
ations never know how and why a decision was taken. The Mozambican associations
invited to participate in such processes are also not part of the ﬁnal decision-making
bodies. Participation in the implementation and monitoring of economic reform policies
appears to be limited. There are indications that associations are simply used by FRELIMO
to give the appearance that the state is allowing participation. Thus, they are co-opted. As a
representative from an organization associated with Business Organisation 1 put it: ‘We
have been captured by the state!’
Most leaders of Business Organisation 1 are members of the ruling party. Some held
government positions or have been asked to occupy government positions. Business
Organisation 1 leaders have privileged access to leading government and ruling party
representatives. According to the aforementioned interviewee, there are many undeclared
personal interests in Business Organisation 1, which leads to clientelism and corruption.
Many of the members support the ruling party’s election campaigns and donate to
FRELIMO at times. Those associations that the ruling FRELIMO and state agencies do
not want to listen to are excluded from consultation processes.
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In Vietnam, the impact that this kind of infrastructural power has on associations leads
to intense cooperation between the state and certain professionals’ and business organiz-
ations. Our interviews suggest that this cooperation beneﬁts mainly the state. The inter-
views with representatives from Business Organisations 2 and 3 and Professionals’
Association 1 show not only that these organizations accept the political structures and
the state’s invitation to work within those structures, but also that they are strongly
engaged in helping improve the SME-promotion policies that are formulated and adopted.
Over time, these organizations have gained a favourable position in these policy-formu-
lation processes, and the state has rewarded them in various ways for their contribution to
improving policies: Business groups such as Vietnamese Business Organisations 2 and 3
and professionals’ associations such as Professionals’ Association 1 are involved in the
ﬁnal stages of decision-making processes in the National Assembly and/or in committees
and councils at the city level. Since 2008, Business Organisation 3 has also been responsible
for collecting the SMEs’ opinions on various new laws and for transmitting them to the
state. Since 2012, Business Organisation 3 has also represented the business community
vis-à-vis the state when the latter is involved in negotiating trade pacts and other relevant
international treaties. As an umbrella organization, Professionals’ Association 1 rep-
resents, guides, and leads various organizations of business people based in Ho Chi
Minh City. The state strongly supports all three organizations. To give just one
example: The state pays for the staﬀ, oﬃces, and cars of Business Organisations 2 and 3.
Policy-formulation and decision-making processes remain under the ﬁrm control of
the Communist Party. That the real power resides with the ruling party and that its
members make the ﬁnal decisions was made clear in interviews with representatives
from Business Organisation 3: ‘The Party leaders’ opinion is the most important’.
Associations and the Discursive Power of the State
As regards the policy ﬁeld of gender equality and women’s rights, our ﬁndings vary.
Whereas in Algeria in particular secular associations often support relevant state discourse
and policies, in Mozambique and, even more so, in Vietnam associations both support the
state discourse and state policies in this ﬁeld but also articulate criticism. In Vietnam some
associations also criticize the state discourse and policies regarding marriage equality (i.e.,
same-sex couples’ right to civil marriage).
In Algeria, many secular associations working in the ﬁeld of gender portray the partici-
pation of women in the political sphere as a major step towards the modernization of
society. They, albeit perhaps unintentionally, echo the oﬃcial gender discourse of the
Algerian state. These associations thus help to legitimize the Algerian state or at least
the discourses it pursues. Secondly, while many secular associations would still like to
go further, the state has given in to many demands articulated by associations and has
reformed several laws relating to women’s rights, such as the criminal code and the
family code. This allows the state to portray itself as responsive to pressure from the
secular women’s rights movement. Finally, many secular associations have accepted
that they must work within the legal and discursive framework established by the state
as far as the personal status law for women is concerned. Rather than advocating the com-
plete abrogation of the family code, they have begun acting pragmatically and are lobbying
for an amendment of the code. They are thus reinforcing the well-known ‘duality’ imposed
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by the Algerian state with regard to women’s rights: while women’s participation in the
public and political spheres is encouraged, women continue to be considered minors in
various realms of private and family life. There are, however, a few NGOs (such as Alger-
ian NGO 3) and other secular associations aﬃliated with leftist opposition forces which
refuse to work within the state’s legal and discursive framework and openly advocate
for the complete abrogation of the family code.
Secular associations’ explicit and implicit support for the state’s discourse and policies
in the ﬁeld of gender can mostly be traced back to the existing polarization between secular
and Islamist forces. While many secular associations would like to see more progress as far
as the reform of many laws relating to women’s rights is concerned, they still opt to
cooperate with the authoritarian state. This is because they prefer the current authoritarian
but largely secular political system over what they presume would be established if the Isla-
mist opposition were to obtain power. This allows the state to use the secular middle class
in general and the secular women’s rights movement in particular to weaken the Islamist
opposition as its political rival.
In Mozambique, associations support FRELIMO’s discourse of ‘equality and emancipa-
tion’, which stems from the time of the one-party regime, and which is also expressed in
the existing quota system for political positions within the ruling FRELIMO party. As in
Algeria, Mozambican associations stress the role that women played in the liberation
struggle against the colonial regime. However, these associations criticize that the
oﬃcial policy of gender equality is contradicted by (male) state representatives – for
example, those who defended paragraphs in the proposed revised penal code, such as
the one stipulating the exemption of a rapist from prosecution if he marries the woman
in question. With respect to this code, the associations have helped to have alterations,
such as the decriminalization of abortion, included. They have also created public pressure
through marches that ultimately led to the withdrawal of some of the paragraphs that vio-
lated women’s rights. Some association representatives also criticize the gap between
oﬃcial gender policies promoting ‘equality and emancipation’ and the state’s acceptance
of a minor role for women in private life.
In Vietnam, one segment of the associations, especially Mass Organisation 3, generally
supports the state’s gender equality and women’s rights policies, whereas some NGOs both
support and criticize state policies, especially those concerning marriage equality and the
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. NGOs support, for
example, a complete ban of domestic violence and the idea that ‘housework be considered
an income-generating job’. Relevant legal clauses regarding both issues ﬁgure in the 2014
Marriage and Family Law. Still, associations criticize missing deﬁnitions and other clauses
in the law and in other related laws (e.g., a clear deﬁnition of forced sex and sexual vio-
lence). The issue of same-sex marriage has given rise to strong principle-based diﬀerences
between Mass Organisation 3 and the majority of National Assembly members and state
and party representatives on the one hand, and certain NGOs on the other. The funda-
mentally divergent views concern the concepts and underlying understanding of
gender, gender norms, and gender relations. For example, NGO 5 ‘moves past the
male–female gender binary’, seeing ‘men and women, gays and lesbians, etc. as elements
of a whole. And in doing so, it becomes important that, regardless of who someone is, s/he
has a right to be treated equally’.
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Associations and their Impact on State Power
In this section we discuss what our ﬁndings imply for the maintenance and weakening of
the two forms of state power in Algeria, Vietnam and Mozambique. As noted above, the
‘weakening’ of the infrastructural and discursive power of the authoritarian state means
support for the development of citizens’ individual and collective self-determination
and autonomy; the ‘maintenance’ of such sources of power means that the negation of
self-determination and autonomy receives support. To assess the qualities of associations,
we refer to the four above-mentioned patterns of authoritarianism and to the patterns
which help us to identify democracy-promoting consequences.
As regards the nexus between the state’s infrastructural power and intra-organizational
decision-making processes, we ﬁnd that the interviewed associations tend to succumb to
this form of power in all three countries. The state’s and/or the state ruling party’s inter-
ference in internal decision-making processes is widely accepted, or at least not openly
rejected. Although in diﬀerent ways and with some exceptions, most associations are orga-
nized hierarchically. In most associations there are also structures and mechanisms in
place that ensure the prioritization of groups (ruling the state and/or ruling the associ-
ation) and their interests over the individual (in the association) and their interests. Some-
thing that is most evident in Vietnamese associations but also observable in Algerian and
in Mozambican associations is a strong push for homogeneity and uniformity. Moreover,
these organizations develop what Stenner (2005, p. 18) calls ‘groupiness’. A good example
of what this implies is the various Vietnamese associations’ use of the ‘minority-follows-
majority’ mechanism after a decision is taken. Finally, at least in the case of Vietnamese
and Algerian associations, we observe a certain lack of tolerance of views that diverge
from the group’s own, and at least implicitly a certain rejection of diﬀerence and intra-
organizational pluralism. In other words, in most associations we observe characteristics
of intra-organizational authoritarianism, in the sense that individual and collective self-
determination and the autonomy of the individual are severely restricted.
In terms of intra-organizational decision-making processes, some individual skills and
attitudes (e.g., public speaking), and perhaps some virtues (reciprocity, trust, and self-
respect), conducive to the development of democracy might be acquired in associations
in all three countries, though this occurs only to a certain extent. Associations do not
teach how and when to strike a compromise and they do not aid the acquisition of critical
thinking abilities, particularly the ability to deal with conﬂicts and criticism. This suggests
that most associations are not organizations where citizens learn and practise democratic
ideas and acquire virtues conducive to the development of democracy. That said, there
were exceptions to this rule among the NGOs interviewed – for example, the Hanoi-
based Vietnamese NGO 5.
With respect to the infrastructural power of the state in terms of control through
welfare provision, most of the Algerian and Vietnamese associations dealing with HIV/
AIDS issues that we interviewed not only act within the authoritarian state’s structures
but also do not articulate critiques or oﬀer alternatives to those politics and policies (at
least not openly). Through the acceptance of these structures and policies, Algerian and
Vietnamese associations engaged in this policy ﬁeld contribute to the very substance of
authoritarianism by negating the collective and individual self-determination and auton-
omy of PLWHIV and other ‘social minorities’. Such acceptance presumably happens
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because of the relative strength of this form of state power in this particular policy area. In
both countries, the associations interviewed help foster the role of the state as the most
important actor in the ﬁeld of HIV/AIDS prevention.
In Algeria and Vietnam some NGOs take carefully crafted steps towards the support of
PLWHIV and in Vietnam also of other people who are stigmatized in politics and society
(such as sex workers). Such NGOs contribute to strengthening the development of collec-
tive and individual self-determination and autonomy, core elements of processes which
might weaken this form of authoritarian state power. In a related vein, they help to
bring about democracy-promoting consequences – for instance, the development of
virtues conducive to the development of democracy and the assumption of roles that
enable the greater participation of the persons concerned. However, since the activities
of such NGOs in Vietnam are undertaken based on the premise that they do not lead
to any conﬂicts with the authorities, the consequences of such steps in terms of weakening
this speciﬁc form of state power are very limited, if such consequences exist at all. In a
similar way, the fact that Algerian NGOs support the state’s dominant role and explicitly
want to contribute to the realization of state-deﬁned aims in this policy ﬁeld very clearly
limits any consequences that could potentially weaken this speciﬁc form of state power.
In contrast, and presumably also because the infrastructural power of the Mozambican
state in terms of control through welfare provision is not as developed as in the two other
countries, Mozambican associations are able to promote the individual and collective self-
determination and autonomy of PLWHIV. They encourage alternative political forms and
content to those promoted by the people in power – for example, by encouraging
PLWHIV and other people to undertake various kinds of self-help and supporting self-
empowerment, including the formation of networks of aﬀected people. This helps citizens
lead a more self-determined and autonomous life. Thus, Mozambican associations further
weaken this speciﬁc form of state power. This suggests that they contribute to creating a
variety of democracy-promoting consequences, such as the cultivation of virtues condu-
cive to the development of democracy, carrying out roles and responsibilities that
enable the increased participation of aﬀected people and enhancing state agencies’ respon-
siveness towards these people.
With respect to infrastructural power in terms of control through limited participation,
our ﬁndings suggest that the business and professionals’ associations interviewed in all
three countries help maintain this speciﬁc form of state power. Of critical importance is
the associations’ unquestioning acceptance of authoritarian state-determined political
structures and their adherence to the rules that dominate therein. Furthermore, the associ-
ations’ activities signify what Selznick calls ‘limited participation’, which in turn leads to
the co-optation of those associations taking part in policy formulation. In a general
sense, the strategy of inviting professionals’ and business associations can be seen as
part of the state’s attempt to concentrate the representation of certain social sectors in
the hands of selected associations, which serve as exclusive channels for transmitting
the demands of these social sectors to the state.
This strategy seems to be most pronounced and most successfully applied in Algeria
and Vietnam, where hand-picked business and professionals’ associations are used by
the state for the controlled representation and transmission of professionals’ and entrepre-
neurs’ demands. These associations are used to alleviate pressure which might potentially
emerge from these social strata. The co-opted associations leave the decisions regarding
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who should be brought into policy-determining structures and who should have access to
the venues where fundamental decisions on politics and policies are made to the state and/
or the ruling party and their respective decision-making bodies. Thus, the business and
professionals’ associations interviewed in Algeria and Vietnam help legitimize decisions
taken in opaque state and/or party structures. The co-opted associations in all three
countries do not question the fact that the state takes the ﬁnal decisions on laws and pol-
icies, and these associations’ involvement in law- and policy-formulation processes often
increases their acceptance of the resulting state laws and policies. If the activities of the
business and professionals’ associations lead to some sort of weakening of this speciﬁc
form of state power and, related to this, to democracy-promoting consequences – that
is, the representation of certain interests or resistance to planned or taken decisions –
then such consequences are clearly eclipsed by the authoritarianism-supporting conse-
quences that ‘limited participation’ and co-optation produce.
Finally, with respect to the state’s discursive power in the area of gender equality and
women’s rights, most but not all associations in all three countries support the state’s dis-
course and policies in this ﬁeld, though such support varies. Many of these associations
support speciﬁc state-propagated norms concerning gender and gender relationships.
More speciﬁcally, in Algeria many of the interviewed associations operate within the pol-
itical structures, rules, and policies enacted therein, which limit the individual and collec-
tive self-determination and autonomy of women in the private sphere. This is exempliﬁed
by the fact that many associations are seeking to reform the restrictive family code instead
of advocating for its abrogation. In Vietnam, the representatives of Mass Organisation 3
basically have a biologistic and essentialist understanding of gender. They see women’s
roles as unchangeable. According to them, bodily diﬀerences mean that women are care-
givers, mothers, peacekeepers in the home, etc. This clearly restricts women’s self-deter-
mination and autonomy. Moreover, these representatives also reject equal rights for
LGBT people. Their position vis-à-vis the LGBT community is authoritarian: They
show a lack of tolerance vis-à-vis those who diverge from their own and their organiz-
ation’s view and a bias against people who are ‘diﬀerent’. They also reject the idea and
practice of diﬀerence and insist on sameness. Finally, as an integral part of the Communist
Party’s system of rule, Mass Organisation 3 helps legitimize policies and political decisions
in the policy ﬁeld of gender equality, women’s rights, and the rights of sexual minorities
which are made by the ‘party/state’.
There are, however, indications that the state’s discursive power, exerted in and through
the discourse on gender equality, is weakened by at least some associations in all three
countries, though, this happens to varying extents. In Algeria some secular and some
leftist NGOs aﬃliated with the opposition refuse to work within the legal and discursive
framework established by the state and openly advocate for the complete abrogation of the
restrictive family code. In Mozambique, representatives of associations criticize the stark
diﬀerence between the state’s oﬃcial policies regarding gender equality and the state’s
acceptance of women’s inferior status in private life. In Vietnam, strong principle-based
diﬀerences between associations are visible with respect to the issue of same-sex marriage
and the rights of sexual minorities/LGBT people. The Vietnamese NGOs interviewed by
us take up positions and activities that are supportive of the collective and individual self-
determination and autonomy of women and sexual minorities/LGBT people. Thus, in all
three countries at least some NGOs as well as some other associations help formulate
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counter-positions to the state discourse on gender. They engage in the political and
societal discourse on gender norms in a way which is apt to increase the power, social
status, and recognition, legal and otherwise, of women and sexual minorities.
Conclusions
Do associations in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam support infrastructural and discur-
sive forms of power of the authoritarian state? Or do some of these organizations weaken
particular forms of state power? To answer these questions we analysed the interdepen-
dent and reciprocal relations between associations and these forms of state power in the
area of intra-organizational decision-making and in three policy ﬁelds.
Most associations interviewed by us in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam accept, or at
least do not openly reject, the state’s and/or the state ruling party’s various forms of inter-
ference in internal decision-making processes. Authoritarian state-determined structures
are accepted, if not enforced. Most of these associations are organized in a hierarchical, if
not outright authoritarian, manner. Although the degree of authoritarian qualities and the
ways intra-organizational power is exerted vary, in most if not all these organizations the
individual and collective self-determination and autonomy of members are restricted, if
not negated. At least in terms of intra-organizational decision-making processes, most
associations in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam are not ‘schools of democracy’ à la
Tocqueville. There are some exceptions – namely, some professionals’ organizations in
Algeria (syndicats autonomes) and some NGOs in Vietnam and Mozambique – but
these organizations represent a minority. In terms of intra-organizational decision-
making, the ‘dark sides’ of associations clearly outweigh their potential ‘bright sides’.
The associations concerned ‘reaﬃrm, legitimize and reproduce elements of authoritarian
structures’ (Lewis, 2013, p. 328) and, in this sense, can be labelled supporters of authori-
tarian rule.
With respect to ‘control through welfare provision’, the ﬁrst form of state infrastruc-
tural power addressed in this article, we ﬁnd that the types of associations that we exam-
ined in Algeria and Vietnam help maintain such power, whereas relevant associations in
Mozambique have the potential to weaken it. The widespread thesis that service-oriented
associations tend to be apolitical and leaning towards if not supporting authoritarian
regimes (for Vietnam see Thayer, 2009; for Algeria Liverani, 2008; see also Lewis, 2013,
pp. 327–329, 337) is thus not easily generalizable. Our ﬁndings suggest that in autocracies,
service-oriented associations, such as NGOs engaged in the welfare sector, play various
roles with respect to existing systems of power. This implies that the relationship
between the state and associations ‘can range from overt and hidden tensions and
active hostility to cooperation and collaboration’ (Banks & Hulme, 2012, p. 6) and that
their role vis-à-vis the state is a contested one. In other words, the role of associations
is ‘far more complex than that proposed by the liberal democratic view, and concomi-
tantly, by those donors bent on funding NGOs in order to build a strong civil society’
(Mercer, 2002, p. 19). Notwithstanding such criticism, our ﬁndings suggest that donors’
funding of Mozambican associations engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention and care provision
for PLWHIV has helped local associations widen their room to manoeuvre and enabled
them to weaken the Mozambican state’s ‘control through welfare provision’ in this par-
ticular policy ﬁeld.
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As regards the second form of infrastructural state power, ‘control through limited par-
ticipation’, our conclusion is unambiguous: The professionals’ and business associations
interviewed in all three countries help maintain this form of state power. This ﬁnding con-
tradicts the expectations still held by many practitioners of international development
cooperation. We suggest that the fundamental material and/or non-material interests of
such organizations need to be taken more carefully into account. What also needs to be
understood is that many authoritarian regimes have the means to pacify such organiz-
ations and to keep them under the state’s thumb without the use of force. The cases of
professionals’ and business organizations in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam illustrate
the ability of the authoritarian state in this respect. Co-optation can help depoliticize
potential social discontent and channel it into forms of expression that do not challenge
the authoritarian nature of the state. On a broader theoretical level, our ﬁndings thus
support the thesis that co-optation also helps stabilize autocracies (Gerschewski, 2013).
Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that the co-optation of associations contributes to the per-
sistence of a variety of autocracies and not only of competitive authoritarian regimes as
Giersdorf and Croissant (2011, p. 4) argue.
With respect to the discursive power of the state, our ﬁndings show that most inter-
viewed associations in all three countries help maintain the state’s discursive power in
the ﬁeld of gender equality and women’s rights – though this happens in various ways
and to varying extents. In all three countries at least some NGOs help weaken this
form of state power. In this policy ﬁeld that we ﬁnd associations which are both supporters
of authoritarian state power and forces which help to weaken it. The role of some Vietna-
mese NGOs in the gender-related discourse and the discourse on the rights of LGBT
people serves as a case in point. That the state does not harshly repress those activities con-
tradicts at least in part Lewis’s thesis that ‘authoritarian states have become adept at
restricting NGOs to roles commensurate with self-organization, while severely restricting
discursive activities’ (Lewis, 2013, p. 337). In Algeria, Vietnam, and Mozambique, associ-
ation activities that are critical of the state’s discourse on gender norms, gender relations,
and the rights of sexual minorities are possible. This is all the more astonishing because the
exertion of discursive power by the state in the form of a sustained inﬂuence on gender
norms and gender relationships is ‘a central component in the ﬁeld of state hegemony,
as state discourses produce hegemonic masculinity and gender hierarchy’ (Sauer, 2001,
pp. 166–167, our translation). Future research should explore whether associations’
opportunities to weaken this form of state power reﬂect the speciﬁcs of the ‘gender’
policy ﬁeld or a relative ‘weakness’ of discursive power as a speciﬁc form of state power
in autocracies, or both.
Future research should also probe further into the implications of the diﬀerent extents
of ‘civic space’ under authoritarian rule in post-socialist Algeria, Mozambique and
Vietnam. Whereas our comparative research design was based on the fundamental simi-
larities of these three countries in terms of the type and development of authoritarian rule,
our ﬁndings do indicate that associations’ room for manoeuvre eﬀectively diﬀers in the
three settings. While such room for manoeuvre is extremely narrow in Vietnam and
very narrow in Algeria, associations in Mozambique seem to enjoy some more leeway
(which might be due to foreign donors’ interventions). Future research should thus
explore how the varying scope of associations’ freedom of action for associations is con-
nected to the extent of political competitiveness in these three regimes and what
112 J. WISCHERMANN ET AL.
diﬀerences in this regard mean for the ability of local associations to pursue their policy-
oriented preferences.
In most general terms, our ﬁndings indicate that there is not one particular type of
association which, without further qualiﬁcation, helps weaken state power in autocracies.
Nor do all types of associations help maintain infrastructural and discursive state power in
such regimes. Studies of associations should thus not start from the assumption that such
organizations are either supporters of democracy or supporters of authoritarian rule. It is
more fruitful to see associations as fundamentally ‘polyvalent’ (Kößler, 1994). Our
research demonstrates the usefulness of a theoretically grounded, power-focused, and rela-
tional perspective for empirical analyses of the roles played by associations under author-
itarian rule. Using such an approach helps focus autocracy research on the state, society,
and, more importantly, the complex relations and interactions between the two.
Notes
1. In our study we had to omit the impact of ‘despotic power’ on associations and vice versa as
an analysis of this sensitive form of state power could have endangered the safety of our aca-
demic cooperation partners and of our interviewees.
2. For Selznick (1949, p. 13) co-optation is ‘the process of absorbing new elements into the lea-
dership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to
its stability or existence. […] Cooptation may be formal or informal, depending on the
speciﬁc problem to be solved.’
3. An anonymized list of cited associations and interview dates is available upon request from
the authors. So are the guidelines for the two-stage interviews.
4. The decision on what counted as a typical association for each type was based on the collec-
tive judgement of the core research team and its academic partners in the respective country.
For reasons of comparability we excluded types of associations, which do not exist in all three
countries or which vary signiﬁcantly in terms of their respective form, activities, number,
importance, etc. (such as Community-based Organizations).
5. In Algeria, exceptions to this rule are some independent labour unions (syndicats autonomes)
and some human rights organizations.
6. Again, in Algeria some independent labour unions represent an exception to this rule.
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